o | Preliminary Proxy Statement |
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o | Definitive Proxy Statement |
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QUALSTAR CORPORATION |
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Dear Fellow Qualstar Shareholder: | June 7, 2012 |
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Vote the enclosed WHITE proxy card AGAINST Bronson’s proposal to remove the current Board members and discard any Gold proxy card you may have received or may receive in the future from BKF or Bronson.
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Even if you have already returned or voted a Gold proxy card, it is simple to change your vote. All you need to do is vote the WHITE proxy card, by telephone, over the internet or by mail, by following the instructions you will find on the WHITE proxy card, AGAINST Bronson’s proposal. Only your last vote will count.
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BKF’s proxy statement dated June 5, 2012, discloses that BKF is an “investment company” under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“1940 Act”) THAT HAS FAILED TO REGISTER WITH THE SEC AS IT IS REQUIRED TO DO, and further discloses that:
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BKF plans to change its operations to avoid being subject to the 1940 Act. However, to do so, BKF may have to divest certain of its investments, including its investment in Qualstar.
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BKF admits that, if it should obtain control of Qualstar’s Board and then be required to divest its shares of Qualstar, there will be no directors on Qualstar’s Board whose interests will be aligned with the interests of Qualstar’s shareholders.
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Although BKF states that it would attempt to effect a divestiture of its Qualstar shares in a manner that would not be disruptive to the trading of Qualstar’s NASDAQ-traded stock, it fails to explain how it could sell off nearly 18% of Qualstar’s shares without disrupting trading and driving down the price of Qualstar’s shares significantly, which could result in a delisting of Qualstar’s shares from NASDAQ.
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Bronson was Mikron’s CEO for only 9 months, from August 1998 to May 1999, more than 12 years ago, and the turnaround occurred long after he left Mikron and the ultimate sale of Mikron, which he takes credit for, occurred in 2007, 8 years after his departure.
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Moreover, while Bronson makes much of his tenure at Mikron, to our knowledge, he has never publicly disclosed why he left Mikron after only 9 months.
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Bronson has been CEO of Interlink Electronics, Inc. since July 2010. During his two-year tenure:
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Interlink has incurred losses in 7 of 8 quarters.
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Interlink’s net worth has declined by nearly $1.1 million, or 25%.
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In the quarter ended March 31, 2012, Interlink’s profits (from continuing operations) totaled only $186,000.
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Abysmal Operating Performance
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4NET Software, Inc. Under Bronson’s management, 4Net has a record of 16 consecutive years of losses and is now just a shell corporation with virtually no assets.
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Ridgefield Acquisition Corp. Bronson acquired control and became the President of Ridgefield in 2000. During the succeeding 10 years Bronson acquired more Ridgefield shares, including by means of the related party transactions described below. Once, and only after Bronson had increased his ownership to 82% in 2011, he distributed most of Ridgefield’s remaining cash. At March 31, 2012, Ridgefield’s assets and tangible book value had declined to $31,000 and $34,000, respectively and, like 4Net, Ridgefield is now just a shell company.
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Related Party Transactions.
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4NET Software and Ridgefield. During Bronson’s tenure as controlling shareholder, Chairman and CEO of 4Net Software and Ridgefield, 4Net and Ridgefield each entered into several agreements to obtain merger and acquisition advisory services and other consulting services from Catalyst Financial, which Bronson controls and of which he is the CEO.
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Catalyst Financial received fees and equity compensation for its advisory and consulting services, in the form of outright issuances of shares from Ridgefield.
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Even though Ridgefield never completed a single merger or acquisition transaction, the fees it paid to Catalyst during a three year period from 2005 to 2008 for its merger and acquisition advisory services represented a significant portion of Ridgefield’s cash at that time.
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Catalyst Financial received fees and stock purchase warrants for the management consulting and advisory services provided to 4Net, even though 4Net was incurring losses throughout the period Catalyst was providing those services.
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Personal Loan to Bronson and Other Related Party Transactions between Bronson and Ridgefield. In addition, Ridgefield made an unsecured personal loan to Bronson to enable him to exercise a warrant to purchase Ridgefield’s shares and extended the term of a stock option which would otherwise have expired, enabling Bronson to increase his share ownership in Ridgefield. Shortly after he succeeded in increasing his share ownership to 82%, Ridgefield’s Board approved and Ridgefield distributed 86% of Ridgefield’s cash.
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Focused only on the Short Term. Despite their assertions to the contrary, BKF and Bronson have failed to articulate any plan for Qualstar other than distributing most of its cash and selling its tape library business, which suggests to us that Bronson, in fact, has no real plan and, therefore, would be putting at jeopardy the future of Qualstar’s successful and growing power supply business.
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No CEO. Bronson and BKF have failed to identify who they would appoint as Qualstar’s CEO if they should obtain control of Qualstar’s Board. Since they apparently have no candidates for that position, they very well could decide to install Bronson as Qualstar’s CEO. As a result, shareholders who vote to support Bronson are taking a big risk by entrusting Qualstar’s future and the value of their shares to someone who may lack the experience and skill set needed to successfully manage and grow Qualstar’s business.
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Trust Me. Bronson is essentially asking you to trust him even though his track record in managing and growing companies is abysmal.
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/s/ William J. Gervais | /s/ Lawrence D. Firestone | |||
William J. Gervais
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Lawrence D. Firestone
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Founder, former President and CEO
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President and CEO, Director
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